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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Interlocking directorates (ID) have been studied for 
quite a long time now and an extensive body of 
literature is available discussing the pros and cons 
of interlocking directorates (for a review see 
Mizruchi, 1996; Lamb & Roundy, 2016). Despite the 
interlocking directorates, the fact that a person sits 
on two or more corporate boards, has attracted 
some criticism (Dooley, 1969; Burris, 2005), it is still 
common in many developed countries, even if recent 
studies have documented a general declining trend 
in national board interlock networks (Chu & Davis, 
2016). A great number of researches on a variety of 
disciplines (management, sociology and finance) has 
highlighted the importance of interlocking 
directorates and there is a growing body of research 
reporting that board interlocks have positive or 
negative impacts on a variety of corporate outcomes. 
Interlocking directorates can be an important source 
of information and a mechanism for gaining a 
competitive advantage; in this way they can improve 
firm's performance, innovative strategy, decision 
making such technology and market trends (Ozmel 
et al., 2013; Mazzola et al., 2016). More generally, 
companies can benefit from interlocks in terms of 
information advantages, social relationships, quality 
and reputation of the directors and monitoring of 
business relationships (Larcker et al., 2013; Simoni & 
Caiazza, 2012; Loderer & Peyer, 2002). But they can 
also cause potential problems firms should be aware 
of, because they could have some negative effect on 
the economic system (Croci & Grassi, 2014), on the 
value of firm and this out of different reasons such 
as distraction, less attention and the resources 
members dedicate to the boards they sit on (Fich & 
White, 2003; Fich & Shivdasani, 2006). In addition, 
the interlocked directors may be an instrument to 
extract private benefits at the expenses of minority 
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shareholders (Silva et al., 2006), thus destroying its 
value. Focusing the attention on the Italian case, 
interlocking directorates is not a new phenomenon 
and it has been an important characteristic of Italian 
capitalism (for an overview concerning the relevance 
of interlocking directorates in the analysis of Italian 
corporate governance, see Rinaldi & Vasta, 2005). 
Italian corporate governance, for its characteristics 
such as ownership concentration, weak investor 
protection, state ownership and presence of 
pyramidal structures, is an ideal setting and there 
are several articles concerning this topic under 
multiple perspectives. Therefore, the purpose of this 
paper is twofold: first to analyze the Italian network 
of interlocking directorships so to verify its 
structural features, in order to find one or more 
“galaxy of firms”. In this regard, we want to 
contribute to the literature on directors interlocks by 
examining the profile of the main board interlockers 
that the Italian director network is formed of and by 
verifying to what extent director networks 
correspond to ownership networks, comparing and 
updating the results by Drago et al. (2011). Second, 
using social network analysis (SNA), we define 
different power form of interlocking directorates 
and then operationalize these concepts with 
reference to centrality metrics. In this way, the paper 
does not only establish, whether the governance of 
the Italian listed companies (FTSE MIB) is based on a 
stable structure over time, but it also aims at 
understanding, how interlocking directorates can 
contribute to understanding the power structure. 
Therefore, the following research questions were 
raised: how interlocking directorates can produce 
different power forms that can influence the genesis 
of power coalitions? 
As noted by Croci and Grassi (2014), we are 
dealing with an important issue since different 
predictions are possible on the effect of network 
centrality on the corporate outcome and since 
interlocking directorates could contribute to 
collusion. By investigating not only the “number” of 
graph edges but also the “importance” of each 
individual edge, our aim is to capture the different 
“power form” by interlocking directorates. A firm’s 
position in the interlocking directorate plays an 
important role in determining its strategies and 
structures (Connelly & Van Slyke, 2012). Social 
network analysis is adapted to visualize the network 
structure of interlocking directorates (Freeman, 
2004). This study is therefore first and foremost an 
update of the paper by Drago et al. (2011) and it 
investigates, whether the existence of a galaxy of 
Mediobanca is confirmed in Italy and it also aims at 
identifying any powerful firms in this network 
structure. Secondly, this paper aims at measuring 
the power forms of interlocking directorates. This 
will allow us to better explain the role of 
interlocking directorates in the Italian scenario. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
presents an overview of the theoretical background 
of interlocking directorates, offers a brief literature 
review of interlocking directorates, focusing on 
previous studies of the Italian case, and, finally, 
derives the hypotheses to test. Section 3 describes 
the methodology and data. Results are presented in 
Section 4 and discussed in Section 5. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND, LITERATURE 
REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1. Theoretical background 
 
The literature on interlocking directorates is huge 
and fragmented as fragmented is the multifaceted 
nature of this topic, which often involves a mixture 
of several disciplines insisting on the field and 
different levels of analysis (Caiazza & Simoni, 2015). 
Academic literature has usually used two units of 
analysis (individuals/ firms) and two theoretical 
lenses of analysis (individuals/institutions) to 
explain interlocking directorates and their existence 
has been outlined in different ways (Romano & 
Favino, 2013). According to Lamb and Roundy 
(2016), the background of interlocking activities 
under firm’s perspective consists of: i) resource-
seeking: interlocks, in particular in financial sector, 
will help their firms create connections with other 
organizations to minimize environmental 
uncertainty; ii) monitoring: firms can also engage in 
interlock activities in an attempt to improve their 
monitoring ability; iii) signaling: a firm’s board of 
directors can also be used to send a signal to current 
and potential investors; iv) accessing human capital: 
a director can also be appointed to an interlocking 
position because of his or her particular human 
capital. From an interlocking director’s perspective, 
it is possible to find two antecedents: career 
advancement and increased social ties. In the first 
case, executives can join multiple boards to advance 
their career and extend their connections; in the 
latter, interlocking directors sit on each other’s 
board and socialize in the same elite clubs (e.g. 
country clubs). More generally, there are many 
reasons for the origin of interlocking directorates 
(Mizruchi, 1996; Koening et al., 1979) but Drago et 
al. (2011), for the Italian context, formulate the 
Enlarged Collusion Model. According to the authors, 
enlarged collusion model take place in companies 
that are characterized by concentrated ownership 
and that do not necessarily belong to the same 
business sector. Under the Enlarged Collusion 
Model, the choice of interlocking directorates is 
made by controlling shareholders with the purpose 
to have passive company boards with respect to 
shareholder expropriation (Drago et al., 2015). 
 
2.2. Italian literature review 
 
The Italian scenario (and in particular that of the 
financial sector) is characterized by the phenomenon 
of interlocking directorates in an “extremely 
pervasive” way (Santella et al., 2009). The 
phenomenon of interlocking directorates in Italy was 
already relevant at the beginning of 1920 (Luzzatto 
Fegiz, 1928) and for a long time, interlocking 
directorates have been an important feature of 
Italian capitalism (Vasta & Baccini, 1997; Rinaldi & 
Vasta, 2005, 2009, 2012; Baccini & Marroni, 2016). 
Over the last few years, several studies have been 
investigating the interlocking directorates in Italy 
and several of them – based on empirical evidence – 
confirmed that Italy is pervaded and permeated by 
interlocking directorates (for a brief review, see 
Table 1).  
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Table 1. Brief of Italian literature review 
 
Author(s) 
Year (s) 
analysed 
Aim Results 
Used Social 
Network 
Analysis 
Presence 
of cluster 
Cluster’s Main features 
Baccini and 
Marroni 
(2016) 
2010 
Financial sector analysis: 
comparison between Italian 
and US legislation 
The outcome of the ID 
regulation in Italy is a 
fragmentation of the 
financial sector network 
Yes Yes 
The existence in Italy of 
cohesive clusters is due to 
the family-based capitalism; 
Mediobanca is the central 
node of the network 
Barbi (2000) 
1991-
1998 
Assessment of a connection 
between reduction of voting 
rights/agreements and the 
increase of ID as informal 
agreements 
ID as the most effective tool. 
Reduction of density and 
increase of the asymmetric 
distribution of links. 
No No  
Battiston 
and 
Catanzaro 
(2004) 
1986-
2002 
Decision-making processes 
dynamics: heard behaviour 
The influence is proportional 
to the number of ID between 
the concerned boards. 
No No  
Bellenzier 
and Grassi 
(2014) 
1998-
2011 
Time evolution of 
interlocking directorates in 
Italy from 1998 to 2011 by 
means of dynamical networks 
The key role played by few 
directors 
No Yes 
Small connected components 
concentrated among the Blue 
Chips 
Bianco and 
Pagnoni 
(1997) 
1985- 
1995 
ID extension 
ID as a tool to strengthen 
and/or replace structural 
links 
No Yes 
IN-IN Interlocking 
Directorates are more 
common in pyramidal groups 
Croci and 
Grassi 
(2014) 
2008 
The link between ID and firm 
performance 
The negative ratio between 
network centrality and firm 
value (main ground: high 
ownership concentration) 
Yes Yes 
Presence of a Main 
component and 8 minor 
components 
Di Donato 
and Tiscini 
(2009) 
2002-
2006 
Bank-firm connections effects 
Central role and greater 
advantage brought by ID to 
banks 
No No  
Drago et al. 
(2015) 
1998-
2007 
The link between ID and firm 
performance 
The negative effect of ID on 
firm performance; reforms 
were only partially effective 
on the short-term (density 
reduction, increased the key 
role of some actors) 
Yes No  
Fattobene et 
al. (2017) 
1998-
2013 
What extent personal ties 
among the directors of Italian 
listed companies have 
changed after the financial 
crisis of 2008 and the 
introduction of the 
Interlocking Ban in 2011 
ID stable features; increase 
of comulation ratio due to 
the increase in the number 
of assignments to few 
directors. The ID is still 
functional to preserve 
control stability. 
Yes Yes 
Cohesive and stable Clusters; 
removal of peripheral nodes. 
Gambini et 
al. (2012) 
2009 Analysis of network stability 
The existence of a cohesive 
group of companies 
occupying a central position 
(directors belonging to the 
most exclusive elite) 
Yes Yes 
Definition of clusters based 
on: 
Family control and 
Cross Shareholding 
network 
Manzo et al. 
(2014) 
2000-
2012 
Privatization effects on 
governance and network ID 
State-owned companies 
feature the same 
heterogeneity in terms of 
governance as the other 
listed companies 
Yes Yes 
Telecom: most connected 
and central node 
Romano and 
Favino 
(2013) 
2006-
2010 
The effects of the 
international crisis on ID 
network structure 
Lower density and greater 
centrality and stability of few 
cliques 
Yes Yes 
Identification of a larger 
subgroup having a higher 
number of members and a 
reduced number of IDs 
Santella et 
al. (2010) 
1998-
2006 
Analysis of network stability 
The existence of the Lords of 
Italian Stock Market; the 
major 9 Italian family-owned 
companies have acquired 
100 IDs in 9 years 
Yes Yes 
The highest ID level is one of 
the Italian Blue Chips 
Simoni and 
Caiazza 
(2012) 
1998-
2006 
Analysis of both the structure 
and the evolution of 
interlocking directorates 
provides some relevant 
insights into the driving 
forces behind the competition 
among firms. 
Financial sector: prevalence 
of a collaborative approach. 
Manufacturing sector: key 
firms act as brokers between 
players of different 
competitive arenas 
Yes Yes 
Financial sector's network 
structure: concentrated and 
with a giant component 
(Mediobanca) 
Manufacturing sector' 
network structure: more key 
firms 
Simoni and 
Caiazza 
(2013) 
1999-
2006 
Network's dynamics and 
impact on system’s 
competitiveness 
Network stability and main 
firms turnover 
Yes Yes 
In the given period a change 
in the key actors is observed 
and only a subset preserves 
its strategic position – 
Mediobanca, Assicurazioni 
Generali, Alleanza 
Assicurazioni 
 
In sum, it can be observed that: cross-
ownership and interlocking directorates are one of 
the most important sources of separation between 
ownership and control (Di Donato & Tiscini, 2009); 
there is a negative relationship between network 
centrality and firm value (Croci & Grassi, 2014); the 
crisis seems to be a destabilizing factor of 
interlocking ties (Romano & Favino, 2013); collusive 
agreements represent the outcome of a system of 
interlocking directorates, which supports the 
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information exchange among holdings via their 
shared directors (Di Bartolomeo & Canofari, 2015); 
interlocking directorates seem to be instrumental to 
shareholder expropriation (Drago et al., 2015); 
interlocking directorates play a crucial role in 
ensuring the stability of the position of control of 
the biggest private companies and their connections 
with public ones (Rinaldi & Vasta, 2005) and finally 
interlocking directorates could be an instrument to 
improve the ability of the controlling shareholders 
to expropriate minority shareholders and this is 
frequent in large-size companies and less common 
among banks (Barucci, 2006). In addition, board 
members who serve on multiple boards exert both 
positive and negative effects on firm performance, 
and these effects depend on the firm’s relative 
resources (Zona et al., 2015). More recently, 
Fattobene et al. (2017) investigate to what extent 
personal ties among the directors of Italian listed 
companies have changed after two events: 2008 
financial crisis and the introduction of the 
Interlocking Ban in 2011 (Legislative Decree 
no. 201/2001 concerning financial firms). They 
describe the evolution and dimension of the 
phenomenon of interlocking directorship for all the 
Italian listed companies over the period 1998-2013 
by using social network analysis and Principal 
Component Analysis. Results reveal that financial 
crisis has an impact on interlocking directorates 
through different channels and the final output of 
these forces is a general reduction of personal ties. 
In addition, findings suggest that the decrease of the 
cumulation ratio may also be related to the approval 
of Legislative Decree no. 201/2001, which discourages 
the presence of interlocked directors belonging to the 
same business group. The impact of this new law 
(Section 36 of Law Decree 201/20111) is studied also 
by Baccini and Marroni (2016). According to the 
authors, the law fostered two different 
interpretations: a narrower and a broader. The 
narrower interpretation of the law (which considers 
as the reference market of a financial firm the one in 
which it has the biggest share of revenues, according 
to the method elaborated by the Italian Stock 
Exchange) would leave the ID network substantially 
unaltered. A broader interpretation of the law 
(stating that all financial companies must be 
considered as competitors and thus be subjected to 
the law, since they offer the same goods and 
services -banking services, insurance and saving 
products- to customers) instead would completely 
modify the ID network for financial firms, with a 
final configuration totally similar to the one existing 
in US. Different authors study the evolution over 
time of interlocking directorates in Italy. For 
example, Bellenzier and Grassi (2014) study the 
evolution of interlocking directorates from 1998 to 
2011 by recurring to dynamical networks. Their 
purpose is to assess, whether in Italy there is a 
connected and stable structure, due to the presence 
of directors with multiple mandates. The authors 
                                                          
1 The Law Decree 201/2011 (the ‘’Save Italy’’ Decree, converted into the 
Law no. 214/2011) introduces the prohibition of interlocking directorates to 
the art. 36. The law introduces the prohibition on the directors of accepting or 
exercising same positions between firms in the credit markets, insurance and 
finance. The financial sector was the one that showed the greatest 
vulnerability with the 2008 crisis; so, the art. 36 aims to promote competition, 
fight the resulting concentration of control with a reduction in the links 
between the governing bodies and more generally those who exercise top 
functions in competing companies. 
find that, while in the German case all the biggest 
firms are connected to each other, the Italian 
situation is not characterized by a network core, but 
by small networks of companies, which in many 
cases are also very cohesive. Therefore, the Italian 
case features a stable disconnected small structure 
with intense ties, where every component has a 
cohesive structure, often submitted to the 
ownership control of few important families2.  
 
2.3. Hypothesis development 
 
Based on the Italian literature review, one of the 
firms at the center of the Italian network is 
definitely Mediobanca (Santella et al., 2009; Drago et 
al., 2011, Gambini et al., 2012; Baccini & Maroni, 
2016), which plays an important role among the 
Italian listed companies. In particular, Santella et al. 
(2009) and then Drago et al. (2011) coin the term 
“Mediobanca Galaxy” to identify a network of cross-
ownerships involving all the companies that make 
up the Galaxy. According to Drago et al. (2011), 
Mediobanca Galaxy has undertaken an enhanced 
collusion through interlocking directorates that is 
functional to the expropriation by a small group of 
the Galaxy’s controlling shareholders at the 
expenses of the minority shareholders of the Galaxy 
and possibly also of the other Blue Chips with which 
the Galaxy has established board interlocks in 2008. 
This strategic control has been kept until 2008 by 
Mediobanca Galaxy that has been extending its 
structural links network beyond its ownership 
structure or its specific industry sector. Therefore, 
based on the idea that the network of interlocking 
directorates determines the collective economic 
organization of the most significant companies of a 
country (Hall & Soskice, 2001), we suppose (HP1) 
that: “the network of Mediobanca Galaxy continues to 
play a central role in the Italian context”. 
If the firms are linked to each other by 
directors, selected for many reasons as highlighted 
above, they create a social network. In other words, 
the directors who sit in more than one board create 
a social network, in which two companies are 
connected directly if they share one or more 
members and indirectly if they share members with 
a third (Burt, 1979). Following a well-established 
tradition of research on interlocking directorates, we 
assume that the interlocking directorates are 
indicative of “power elite”. According to Collins 
(2006, p. 6), power is always contained in an 
organizational form. In order to analyse which type 
of power and to answer our research question, we 
consider two measures: eigenvector centrality and 
betweenness centrality. According to Larcker et al. 
(2013), eigenvector centrality can be interpreted as 
capturing the notions of power and prestige, since a 
board can be defined as well-connected, when it is 
perceived to be prestigious and powerful, giving it a 
special advantage in obtaining resources, 
information and favours. Eigenvector centrality can 
also be seen as a weighted sum of not only direct 
                                                          
2 At least 7 important families are possible to identify in the Italian scenario: 
Caltagirone family; De Benedetti family; Agnelli family; Benetton family, 
Ligresti family, Pesenti family; and Berlusconi family that reinforce the link 
between interlocking directorates and cross-shareholding in the viewpoint of 
power of Italian “salotto buono”, meaning the “fine drawing room” of top 
industrialists and bankers that dominate Italy’s economic life (Corrado and 
Zollo 2006; Messori 2007, Gambini et al., 2012). 
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connections but indirect connections of every length 
(Bonacich, 2007). Therefore, in line with Croci and 
Grassi (2014), we interpret this measure as an 
“effective power”. While betweenness centrality can 
be regarded as a measure of the extent to which an 
actor has control over information flowing between 
others (Newman, 2005). According to Sicilia et al. 
(2016), the betweenness centrality for node “i” is 
calculated by evaluating the number of times that “i” 
is in the shortest path between any other pair of 
nodes. As suggested by Pretorius (2014), Hanneman 
and Riddle (2005, p. 166) define betweenness 
centrality as an indicator of power because it 
“characterizes actors as having positional advantage, 
or power, to the extent that they fall on the shortest 
(geodesic) pathway between other pairs of actors. The 
idea is that actors who are “between” other actors, 
and on whom other actors must depend to conduct 
exchanges, will be able to translate this broker role 
into power.” Therefore, we interpret this measure as 
a “potential power”. Following this line of reasoning 
and achieving our goals, we suppose that (HP2): “the 
enlarged collusion is more likely in companies with 
more potential power than effective power”. 
For enlarged collusion, we mean the extension 
of the network of shared administrators, beyond its 
own ownership structure or business sector. The 
extension of the network beyond these lines 
potentially gives the possibility to obtain necessary 
resources for a greater competitive advantage. These 
are links that are not limited to strengthening 
structural ties but which allow to exercise influence 
and to act as a broker among the information flows 
of the network. This because the companies with 
high betweenness centrality will have a privileged 
position when acting as intermediaries between 
companies without direct connections and, in this 
case, the interlocking directorates are able to 
potentially influence board’s decisions (Battiston et 
al., 2003).  
 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Our database consists of directors sitting on the 
Italian listed company boards (FTSE MIB 40) on 31 
December 2016. A study of interpersonal ties 
existing among the firms of the sample was 
conducted by examining the composition of their 
governing bodies, the board of directors, when 
adopting a traditional or monistic governance model 
and the management board, when adopting a two-
tier model (for BPM, STM, UBI Banca). The analysis is 
broken down into two distinct sections: first, we 
took the study by Drago et al. (2011) to update the 
network of cross-ownerships in Italian listed 
companies (FTSE MIB) and we examined the entire 
network of cross-shareholdings of at least 3% of 
total voting rights3. The relevant shareholdings led 
us to create three different clusters: 50% of the 
                                                          
3 The threshold for the communication of shareholdings in listed companies is 
3% after Law Decree from 15 February 2016, n. 25 (Directive 2013/50/EU of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 amending 
Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about 
issuers, whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market, 
Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or 
admitted to trading and Commission; Directive 2007/14/EC laying down 
detailed rules for the implementation of certain provisions of Directive 
2004/109/EC Text with EEA relevance) 
  
sample is equally represented by Mediobanca Galaxy 
(10 companies) and State-controlled companies (10 
companies); it was not possible to associate the 
remaining 50% to one or more proprietary structure, 
so it has been grouped in Clusters of Remaining 
“Blue Chips”.  
In the second part of the analysis, we employed 
the Social Network Analysis applied to the 
Interlocking Directorates (De Nooy et al., 2005) to 
examine the structural and centrality aspects of the 
company network. Then, we used a set of indicators 
applied at the network level and at the firm level 
(Table 2). 
 
Table 2. A set of indicators 
 
Measures 
Name 
INTERPRETATION 
Firm level 
DEGREE OF 
CENTRALITY 
How many neighbours each node has. 
BETWEENNESS 
CENTRALITY 
Value of betweenness centrality means a crucial 
role played by the company as a key actor in the 
network connection and as a key broker in the 
exchange of information and resources. 
EIGENVECTOR 
CENTRALITY 
The board’s well-connectedness based on the 
well-connectedness of its direct links 
Network level 
NETWORK 
DENSITY 
Is equal to the number of lines in a network 
expressed as a proportion of the maximum 
number of possible lines 
AVERAGE 
DEGREE 
The average number of connections between 
businesses within the network. 
 
The firm level analysis enabled us to 
investigate the strategic position chosen. The first 
set of measures we took into account is related to 
centrality, which is measured through the “degree of 
centrality” showing how many neighbours each node 
has. A higher degree value indicates that a firm has a 
relatively high number of links with other firms and 
it is, therefore, more central in the interlocking 
directorates’ network; through “betweenness 
centrality” the intermediary position of a node with 
respect to the information flow passing through the 
network has been assessed. A high value of 
betweenness centrality means a crucial role played 
by the company as a key actor in the network 
connection and as a key broker in the exchange of 
information and resources. Finally, through the 
“eigenvector centrality,” we measured the board’s 
well-connectedness based on the well-connectedness 
of its direct links. This measure can be interpreted 
as capturing the notions of power and prestige 
(Larcker et al., 2011)  
At the network level, we used “network 
density” and “average degree” to verify the idea that 
more ties between interlocking directorates lead to a 
tighter structure. The first indicator is equal to the 
number of lines in a network, expressed as a 
proportion of the maximum number of possible 
lines (De Nooy, et al., 2011). This indicator describes 
the part of potential connections that is effective; 
the range is 0-1 (from when there are no actual 
connections to when all nodes are connected to each 
other). Density is usually defined as the average 
force of the links between all possible connections; 
intuitively we can conclude that the density of a 
network is inversely proportional to the size of the 
network. The latter indicates the average number of 
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connections between businesses within the network. 
The indicator is calculated by comparing the total 
number of connections in the graph to the total 
number of nodes that are part of it; the average 
density increases at the increase of the average 
degree of connectivity.  
The graphic representation of the network 
structure is defined as “sociogram” and it is 
composed of vertices – representing companies – 
and edges – representing the links between two or 
more companies. The direction and strength of the 
links were not considered in the analysis and the 
result is an indirect type graph. In the event of 
directors with more than 2 positions, the links 
between companies were considered separately 
(having A, B and C as companies chaired by the same 
Director the links considered were: A-B, B-C, C-A). A 
limit of this specific type of graph that excludes the 
direction of links is that it does not allow identifying 
the type of interlocking directorates in the object 
(Bianco & Pagnoni, 1997). Vice versa, the exclusion of 
the force of link does not imply relevant limitations; 
the weight potentially attributable to the link was 
replaced by a number of lines equal to the number 
of interlocked directors. The weight of the edges 
could be anyway measured as the number of lines 
connecting two nodes. Two nodes are connected by 
an arc if the two nodes/firms share one director: 
every link between two nodes is a shared director. 
Finally, we used a one-mode network for the 
companies to establish the relational structure 
between businesses. The Gephi software was used to 
calculate the key synthetic network indicators and to 
obtain a graphic representation of the network. 
Gephi is an open-source program available at 
www.gephi.org. 
 
4. RESULTS 
 
Compared to 2008 a reduction of the leading role of 
Mediobanca Galaxy in terms of cross-shareholdings 
was reported, dropping from 16 companies to 10 in 
2016 (Figure 1 and Table 3). Vice versa, an increase 
in the number of companies belonging to the Cluster 
of remaining Blue Chips was observed, which has 
risen from 16 to 20. When focusing on the families, 
it can be observed that the Berlusconi's still keep a 
role in Mediobanca Galaxy, both via Mediolanum 
(controlled by Finivest) and Mediaset. The families 
Ligresti (with La Fondiaria and Impregilo) and 
Pesenti (with Italcementi) are no longer part of the 
Galaxy, whereas Vincent Bolloré, having shares both 
in Telecom and Mediaset (along with Generali) 
entered the Italian network.  
 
Table 3. Cluster comparison 2008 vs 2016 
 
 
Number of 
Companies 
Name of 
Companies 
Market 
cap. % 
N° interlocking 
directorate intra 
cluster 
Cluster 2008 (Drago et al., 2011) 
Mediobanca Galaxy 16 
Alleanza; Atlantia; Autogrill; Impregilo; Italcementi; La Fondiaria; 
Lottomatica; Mediobanca; Unicredit; Generali; Mediolanum; Telecom; 
Intesa San Paolo; Mediaset; Mondadori; Pirelli 
36 43 
State Controlled 
Blue Chips 
8 A2A; Enel; ENI; Finmeccanica; Saipem; Snam; STM; Terna 33 0 
Remaining Blue 
Chips 
16 
Banca Popolare; BPM; Bulgari; Buzzi; Fastweb; Fiat; Geox; L’Espresso; 
Luxottica; MPS; Parmalat; Prysmian; Seat; Tenaris; UBI; Unipol 
12 8 
Cluster 2016 
Mediobanca Galaxy 10 
Banca Generali; Finecobank; Generali; Intesa San Paolo; Luxottica; 
Mediaset; Mediobanca; Mediolanum; Telecom Italia; Unicredit 
27 5 
State Controlled 
Blue Chips 
10 
A2A; Enel; ENI; Italgas; Leonardo; Poste Italiane; Saipem; Snam; STM; 
Terna 
32 4 
Remaining Blue 
Chips 
20 
Atlantia; Azimut; BPER; BPM; 
Brembo; Buzzi Unicem; Campari; CNH; Exor; FCA; Ferrari; Moncler; 
Prysmian; Recordati; Salvatore Ferragamo Tenaris; UBI; Unipol; 
UnipolSai; Yoox 
21 20 
 
The biggest-sized cluster in 2016 was the 
Cluster of Remaining Blue Chips. In it, it should be 
pointed out the presence of a new Galaxy defined as 
“nano galaxy Exor”, made of the families of the 
group of the Agnelli's, both for the number of cross-
shareholdings and of shared directors.  
The results (Figure 1) confirm a negative 
declining trend of interlocking directorates inside 
the Mediobanca Galaxy, as already described in 
Drago et al. (2011), the number dropped from 43 to 
only 5 interlocking directorates. The same reduction 
is observable also in the link between Mediobanca 
Galaxy and two other clusters; particularly in the 
case of “state-controlled blue chips” a reduction 
from 10 to 3 interlocking directorates has been 
reported and from 21 to 5 in the case of the 
“remaining blue chips”. An interesting result sees 
the presence of interlocking directorates also within 
the “state-controlled blue chips” cluster, in the 
number of 4 compared to the 0 in 2008. In the 
cluster of the Remaining Blue Chips to conclude, a 
number of 20 interlocking directorates has been 
reported, compared to the 8 in 2008. An increase is 
observable also in the number of interlocking 
directorates existing between the “state-controlled 
blue chips” and the “remaining blue chips” equal 
to 9 compared to the 2 reported in 2008.  
These figures push us to observe a reduction of 
the number of intra- and inter-cluster links, which 
implies a reduction of the network diameter and the 
centrality of a single actor (Mediobanca), thus 
favouring the appearance of a greater number of 
“centers of power” others from Mediobanca. Given 
the above, it can be highlighted that the highest 
number of interlocking intra clusters is reported 
inside the cluster of the remaining Blue Chips, 
where, with the exception of the Nano Galaxy Exor, 
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no prevailing ownership structure is clearly 
observable.  
Therefore, our first hypothesis results are not 
supported since a reduction in the number of links 
between Mediobanca galaxy and the others cluster 
as well as a new galaxy can be recognized in the 
Italian network (the Nano Galaxy Exor). The 
reduction of Mediobanca Galaxy can definitely be 
ascribed above all to the effect of the recently 
entered legislation, successive to Drago’s study, 
concerning the introduction of restrictions to the 
financial sector due to the occurrence of the 
phenomena of the interlocking directorates (article 
36 D.L. 2011/201, as successively amended by Law 
2011/214.
 
Figure 1. The three building blocks (directors) at 31 December 2016 
 
 
After the first part of the analysis, we 
calculated a one-mode network for the companies to 
establish the structure of links existing between 
firms. Figure 2 in the Appendix shows the 
interconnections between firms in the Italian listed 
companies. 
The obtained graph shows 40 nodes 
representing the single companies’ part of the 
sample, 46 links among their boards of directors 
with the participation of 33 shared board members. 
The difference obtained between the number of 
interlocking directorships and that of shared board 
members involved is given by the assignment of more 
than one position to some members of the board.  
At the network level, the analysis (Table 4) 
reported a not too high average degree (equal to 2,3) 
and a 5,6% density, showing that we are far from a 
full configuration of the graph, which allows us to 
assume a high vulnerability of the network.  
 
Table 4. Measures at the network level 
 
Measure Value 
Average Degree 2,3 
Network Density 5,6% 
 
Below the values obtained with a ranking per 
cluster (Table 5). 
Table 5. Measures at network level per cluster 
 
Cluster Nodes Edges 
Average 
Degree 
Network 
Density 
Mediobanca Galaxy 10 5 1 13,9 
Rimanenti Blue 
Chips 
20 20 2 5,3 
State Controlled 
Blue Chips 
10 4 0,8 4,4 
 
The percentage of networks density informs 
about how fast information circulates in the network 
and it seems that, despite the lower number of 
interlocking directorates, the flow of information is 
faster inside the Mediobanca galaxy, which is 
probably due to the effect of cross-shareholding. As 
for density, a lower percentage in Mediobanca 
Galaxy can be observed, as opposed to the 
Remaining blue chips.  
The results of the measurement of centrality at 
firm level are reported in Table 6. 
Our results show that not all the firms 
reporting the highest value of eigenvector centrality 
also show the highest value of betweenness 
centrality. Therefore, some firms are central because 
they are highly connected and other firms are more 
influential in acting and controlling the information.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corporate Board: Role, Duties & Composition / Volume 14, Issue 2, 2018 
 
14 
Table 6. Centrality measures at the firm level 
 
 Firm Cluster* Degree Centrality Eigenvector centrality Betweenness centrality 
1 A2A State Controlled BC 3 0 0 
2 Atlantia Remaining BC 2 0,134 1 
3 Azimut Remaining BC 0 0 0 
4 Banca Generali Mediobanca G 0 0 0 
5 Mediolanum Mediobanca G 0 0 0 
6 BPM Remaining BC 0 0 0 
7 Bper Remaining BC 1 0 0 
8 Brembo Remaining BC 5 0,149 0 
9 Buzzi Remaining BC 2 0,149 0 
10 Campari Remaining BC 3 0,386 1 
11 CNH Remaining BC 2 0,404 0 
12 Enel State Controlled BC 1 0 0 
13 Eni State Controlled BC 3 0,163 4 
14 Exor Remaining BC 5 0,598 0,5 
15 FCA Remaining BC 5 1 0 
16 Ferrari Remaining BC 6 0,698 2,5 
17 Finecobank Mediobanca G 2 0,151 4 
18 Generali Mediobanca G 3 0,203 0 
19 Intesa San Paolo Mediobanca G 3 0 0 
20 Italgas State Controlled BC 3 0,301 0 
21 Leonardo State Controlled BC 0 0 0 
22 Luxottica Mediobanca G 2 0 0 
23 Mediaset Mediobanca G 0 0 0 
24 Mediobanca Mediobanca G 3 0,081 3 
25 Moncler Rimanenti BC 3 0,232 0 
26 Poste Italiane State Controlled BC 1 0,149 0 
27 Prysmian Remaining BC 3 0,232 0 
28 Recordati Remaining BC 1 0,081 0 
29 Saipem State Controlled BC 4 0,444 0 
30 Salvatore Ferragamo Remaining BC 0 0 0 
31 Snam State Controlled BC 3 0,165 0 
32 STM State Controlled BC 0 0 0 
33 Telecom Mediobanca G 5 0,458 3 
34 Tenaris Remaining BC 2 0,149 0 
35 Terna State Controlled BC 2 0,218 0 
36 UBI Rimanenti BC 0 0 0 
37 Unicredit Mediobanca G 0 0 0 
38 Unipol Remaining BC 5 0 0 
39 UnipolSai Remaining BC 6 0,794 0 
40 Yoox Remaining BC 3 0,386 3 
Note: * Mediobanca Galaxy; Remaining Blue Chips; State Controlled Blue Chips 
 
The results show that the top 10 firm with the 
highest potential power is the following (Table 7): 
Eni, Finecobank Telecom, Yoox, Mediobanca, Ferrari, 
Campari, Atlantia, Exor. These companies are 
therefore key actors or “center of power” through 
which the biggest amount of information flows and 
which allow a higher connection of the entire 
network. From the perspective of enlarged collusion, 
among companies with a higher betweenness 
centrality are identified some “centers of power”. 
These companies have connections that go beyond 
their own ownership structure or sector and since 
powerful from the point of view of network’s 
connections, have a greater possibility of exploiting 
the information flows intercepted. These companies 
can take advantage of information management. 
This result supports our HP2. The top 10 companies 
with an effective power are (Table 8): FCA, UnipolSai, 
Ferrari, Exor, Telecom, Saipem, CNH, Yoox, and 
Campari. In this case, the historical presence of 
family groups that has influenced directors’ 
appointments and family ownership, have created a 
specific network structure, a “nano galaxy Exor”. 
 
Table 7. Top 10 firms by Betweenness centrality 
 
Firm Category Betweenness centrality 
Eni State Controlled BC 4 
Finecobank Mediobanca G 4 
Telecom Mediobanca G 3 
Yoox Remaining BC 3 
Mediobanca Mediobanca G 3 
Ferrari Remaining BC 2,5 
Campari Remaining BC 1 
Atlantia Remaining BC 1 
Exor Remaining BC 0,5 
 
Table 8. Top 10 firms by Eigenvector centrality 
 
Firm Category Eigenvector centrality 
FCA Remaining BC 1 
UnipolSai Remainingi BC 0,794 
Ferrari Remaining BC 0,698 
Exor Remaining BC 0,598 
Telecom Mediobanca G 0,458 
Saipem State Controlled BC 0,444 
CNH Remaining BC 0,404 
Yoox Remaining BC 0,386 
Campari Remaining BC 0,386 
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5. DISCUSSION  
 
The results discussed in the previous section led us 
to the following remarks:  
First, it is evident that, compared to the data 
used by Drago et al. 2011, relevant changes have 
occurred, both in the Mediobanca Galaxy and in the 
links among the listed companies on Italian stock 
market. More specifically, it can be observed: i) a 
sensitive reduction of the number of interlocking 
directorates inside Mediobanca Galaxy; ii) a 
reduction of the interlocking directorates between 
Mediobanca galaxy and the remaining cluster; iii) an 
increase of the interlocking directorates among the 
state-controlled companies and the remaining 
companies. Even in the perspective of an enlarged 
collision, the position assumed by the controlling 
group of the Mediobanca Galaxy was definitely 
downsized (Baccini & Marroni, 2016). Mediobanca 
and its Galaxy in 2008 were holding 43 interlocking 
directorates out of a total of 84, while in 2016 only 
5. This reduction is due to a removal of a significant 
network of holdings and most likely also to a change 
in the threshold for the communication of 
shareholdings in listed companies.  
Secondly, the synthetic indicators examined – 
which would require a separate further study and a 
validation by expanding the collected data – appear 
to underestimate the existence of a dense network 
of interlocking directorates among Italian 
companies. This would be in line with those studies 
that support the idea of an ongoing gradual 
reduction of the phenomenon of directors’ sharing 
on the national scene (Mizruchi, 2017). More 
specifically a low “average degree” can be observed, 
along with a low density of connections. This result 
confirms the findings of Fattobene et al. (2017) 
according to whom both the crisis and the new 
legislation have had an impact on the phenomenon 
of interlocking directorates. We would also suggest 
that the greater presence of institutional foreign 
investors on Italian market, a broader participation 
to the meetings' quorum and more generally, a 
greater attention to the minorities and the 
engagement shares (also following the Shareholder 
Right Directive) in Italy (Esposito De Falco et al., 
2017), along with the changes introduced by the 
legislation into the financial sector, contributed to 
an improvement of Italian governance and to 
discourage the occurrence of intense phenomena of 
interlocking directorates. We do believe that the 
same list voting system – a slate voting system for 
the nomination and election of the Board of 
Directors and the Board of Statutory Auditors – 
could be a highly innovative solution not only to 
protect the interests of minority stakeholders but 
also, probably, to discourage interlocking 
directorates. If we pay attention to the name of 
interlocking directorates sitting on more than one 
board, they are elected by the controlling 
shareholders (Appendix – Table 9). The director 
sitting on the highest number of boards is Sergio 
Marchionne, who sits in CNH, Exor, Ferrari and FCA. 
John Elkan, like Marchionne, seats in three firms of 
the same (own) group. These links among companies 
belonging to the same business group are an 
expression of the de facto control relationships. 
Yunpeng HE would appear as the interlocking 
directorate chosen by the State (via Cassa Depositi 
Prestiti) in at least three state-controlled firms. This 
led us to point out that Assogestioni (and generally 
speaking the minority shareholders) are more 
careful when choosing the directors in order to 
avoid creating situations favourable to interlocking 
directorates, as opposed to the controlling 
shareholders.  
Third, in order to find an answer to our 
research question, we considered eigenvector as an 
“effective power”, while betweenness as a “potential 
power”. This allowed us to identify, in the Italian 
scenario, some companies with an effective power 
and some others enjoying a potential power. We 
assumed that firms who are “between” other firms 
and on which other firms need to depend to conduct 
exchanges, will be able to translate this broker role 
into a potential power and to increase the enlarged 
collusion. The potential power shows us the 
possibility of intercepting information flows but it 
can be difficult to extract the related competitive 
advantage, due to the divergence of ownership 
structure and business sector. We also observed that 
the effective power is stronger, when in presence of 
a shared ownership of the companies. In this 
specific case, the companies are part of the “nano 
galaxy Exor” and apparently the controlling 
shareholders seem to create a network in order to 
protect their private benefits of control to the 
detriment of minority shareholders.  
In conclusion, interlocking directorates, thus, 
highlight the embeddedness perspective of 
corporate governance (Davis, 1996), that emphasizes 
that “it’s not what you know, but who you know” and 
“it’s not even who you know, but who they know”. 
This matters for corporate governance often more 
than the individual expertise and the incentives. This 
interpretation would anyway depend on the specific 
governance culture of a company and the context in 
which it operates. In this regard, it should be here 
highlighted that the Italian and European legislative 
innovations4, particularly in the Banking and 
insurance sectors, tend to limit this interpretation. 
In fact, in order to grant a proper satisfaction of 
their functions, the Members of the Board should 
have the professionalism required to perform their 
task and fit the operations and the size of the 
company (particularly for banks). These provisions 
make sure that the shareholders when selecting the 
directors, pay a special attention to these aspects.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
There is a very large literature dealing with 
interlocking directorates on sociology, economics, 
management science among other fields. In this 
paper, we want to contribute to the literature on 
directors interlocks by examining the profile of the 
main board interlockers that the Italian director 
network is formed of and by verifying to what extent 
director networks correspond to ownership 
                                                          
4 Bank of Italy, Supervisory Instructions for Banks – circular no. 285 dated 17 
December 2013 and update 6 May 2014, on corporate governance; Directive 
2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of 
credit institutions and investment firms (CRD IV) – Articles 76, 88, 91, 95; 
EBA guidelines on internal governance (2016); EBA/ESMA joint guidelines 
on the assessment of the suitability of members of the management body and 
key function holders (2016); ECB guide to fit and proper assessments (2017); 
Italian Legislative Decree 39/10 as amended (Italian Legislative Decree 
135/16) – Article 19. 
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networks, comparing and updating the results by 
Drago et al. (2011). In addition, this paper also aims 
at understanding, how interlocking directorates can 
contribute to understanding the power forms. 
Interlocking directorates are subject to restrictions 
in some modern economies and the discussion 
whether the Europe Union should adopt some 
restrictions is open. In particular, Italy has 
prohibited interlocking directorates among financial 
companies since 2011 although interlocking 
directorates have been an important feature of 
Italian capitalism. Therefore, Italian context remains 
a suitable candidate for the analysis of its 
interlocking directorates. Our results show a 
sensitive reduction of the number of interlocking 
directorates inside Mediobanca Galaxy and an origin 
of new Galaxy Exor.  
In addition, to the best of our knowledge, 
nobody has interpreted eigenvector and 
betweenness centrality as effective and potential 
power of firms, and through this form of power a 
relationship with enlarged collusion. These 
considerations – that would require a deeper 
analysis based on a broader sample of companies 
and a longer observation period – provide some 
important contributions to corporate governance 
literature and to policymakers. 
First, by using social-network analysis we 
measured the degree, eigenvector and betweenness 
centrality, measures that give the value of power, 
prestige and ability to receive information by a firm. 
From our limited point of view, our suggestion was 
to consider eigenvector as “effective power” and 
betweenness as “potential power”. In this way, we 
provide a framework for selecting Italian firms with 
effective and potential power – around whom 
interactions and processes can be traced and 
analysed, carrying out a “quantitative’ and 
‘qualitative” analysis. 
Second, a strong control position on behalf of 
the ownership of the firm (i.e. Agnelli family) makes 
interlocking directorates as a “legal device”, in order 
to support the block-holder position. This 
conclusion, on the one hand, may seem obvious, on 
the other hand it could contribute to a better 
understanding of the actions (and ways) of the 
controlling shareholders to the detriment of 
minority shareholders, especially in a context with a 
strong concentration of ownership like the Italian 
one (Sancetta et al., 2018).  
Third, this research shows that Italian 
interlocking directorates are proposed by controlling 
shareholders and not by minority shareholders. 
Therefore, taking into account the accumulation of 
their professional duties as a relevant factor for the 
efficacy of their decisions, we can suggest 
considering that the benefits of interlocking may not 
compensate for the deterioration in the quality of 
decision and monitoring capacity of these 
professionals.  
Our research provides also some policy 
recommendations. If interlocking directorates are a 
symptom of cross-shareholding (Drago et al., 2015), 
in order to protect minority shareholders a reform 
and regulation would be advisable, that do not break 
interlocking directorates in general, but rather a 
reform aiming at breaking the interlocking 
directorates in the specific case of cross-
shareholding. In this regard, a stricter regulation 
would be desirable on the number of other positions 
covered. New rules and mechanisms of control 
should be rethought with a view to reducing the 
potential of extraction of private benefits by the 
controlling coalitions, particularly the pecuniary and 
the high transferable ones. 
Our results, however, should be interpreted 
with caution due to some limitations. First, our 
sample is only made of Italian listed companies in 
FTSE MIB and our analysis is not dynamic. As a 
result, its outcomes probably underestimate the 
occurrence of board interlocking. Second, we divided 
the cluster by cross-shareholding as made by Drago 
et al. (2011), but we cannot completely guarantee 
that no another method exists to create clusters in 
the Italian scenario. Suggestions for future research 
include empirical studies to explore the relations 
between board interlocking and firm strategy and 
governance systems. Understanding how and to 
which extent “galaxy” can influence empirically the 
market and the governance strategy (for example 
private benefit of control) or effective power of 
interlocking directorates could help to improve our 
study. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 9. List of directors with more than one assignment 
 
Directors N° assignment FTSE MIB Firms 
Sergio MARCHIONNE 4 CNH Exor Ferrari 
Maria Elena CAPPELLO 3 A2A Prysmian Saipem 
Gianfelice ROCCA 3 BREMBO Buzzi Unicem Tenaris 
Diva MORIANI 3 ENI Moncler Generali 
John ELKANN 3 Exor Ferrari FCA 
Yunpeng HE 3 Snam Italgas Terna 
Michaela CASTELLI 2 A2A Recordati  
Fabio CERCHIAI 2 Atlantia UnipolSai  
Gilberto BENETTON 2 Atlantia Mediobanca  
Barbara BORRA 2 BREMBO Italgas  
Giovanni CAVALLINI 2 Brembo Poste Italiane  
Catherine Gerardin VAUTRIN 2 Campari Yoox  
Carlo CIMBRI 2 Unipol UnipolSai  
Maria Patrizia GRIECO 2 Enel Ferrari  
Pierluigi STEFANINI 2 Unipol UnipolSai  
Francesco BERARDINI 2 Unipol UnipolSai  
Ernesto DALLE RIVE 2 Unipol UnipolSai  
Nicla PICCHI 2 UnipolSai Saipem  
Andrea AGNELLI 2 Exor FCA  
Pietro GUINDANI 2 ENI Finecobank  
Pietro FERRARI 2 BPER Ferrari  
Alessandro FOTI 2 Finecobank Yoox  
Flavio CATTANEO 2 Generali Telecom Italia  
Paolo COLOMBO 2 Intesa San Paolo Saipem  
Giorgina GALLO 2 Intesa San Paolo Telecom Italia  
Francesca CORNELLI 2 Intesa San Paolo Telecom Italia  
Elisabetta MAGISTRETTI 2 Luxottica Mediobanca  
Luciano SANTEL 2 Luxottica Moncler  
Tarak Benn AMMAR 2 Mediobanca Telecom Italia  
Monica DE VIRGILIIS 2 Snam Prysmian  
Giuseppe RECCHI 2 Telecom Italia UnipolSai  
Robert KUNZE-CONCEWITZ 2 Yoox Campari  
Umberto Carlo Maria NICODANO 2 Brembo Poste Italiane  
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Figure 2. Graph of the Italian corporate network at the end of 2016 
 
 
Two dots are connected by an arc if the two firms share at least one director. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 State Controlled Blue chips 
 Mediobanca Galaxy 
 Remaining Blue Chips 
 
